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NOTES
THE PAYEE OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT AS A HOLDER IN
DUE COURSE-The question, whether the payee of a negotiable

instrument can be a holder in due course under the English Bills of
Exchange Act,' has recently presented itself again. There are situations in which a payee should logically be as fully protected as the
innocent indorsee before maturity who gave value. For example,
the maker of a note might give it to a third person with instructions
to hand it to the payee upon certain conditions, and the third person, disregarding the instructions, might deliver it to the payee in
payment of his own debt. In such a case no consideration would
have passed between the parties to the note; but the payee would have
given value for it to the third person, and he would have had no
knowledge or notice of the fraud. He would then be in every respect
in the same position as the innocent indorsee except that he is not
an indorsee but a payee. There seems to be no reason why that fact
of itself should make a difference. The question, logically, should
be, was he a bona fide holder for value before maturity? Similarly,
if the maker signed a note in blank and authorized his agent to fill
in a certain amount, and the agent wrote in a greater sum and transferred the note to the payee for value moving to himself, the payee's
position would be fundamentally that of an indorsee. In these cases
there is necessarily a third person who comes between the maker
and the payee--who transmits the instrument to the payee. Whether
or not this transmission amounts to a negotiation is the question that
must be settled in order to determine the rights of the payee under
the statute.
The common law of England and of the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States accorded the payee who gave value for
an instrument without notice of its infirmity the same rights given
a holder in due course under the Bills of Exchavge Act and the
Negotiable Instruments Law. 2 One of the early cases most frequently cited in this connectiGn is that of Watson v. Russell,3 in which
A induced B to give him a cheque payable to C. B told A that the
cheque was to be delivered only upon certain conditions; but A delivered it to C for value, without informing him of the conditions.
'45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 (I88a).
'Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514 (Eng., 1780); France v. Clark, 26
Ch. D. 257 (Eng., iSSi); Garrard v. Lewis, io Q. B. D. 3o (Eng., 1882);

Violet v. Patton, 5 Cranch T42 (U. S., x8og); Armstrong v. American Exchange National Bank, 133 U. S. 433 (i890) ; Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball,

io Cush. -373 (Mass., 1852) ; Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio 529 (i855). Contra:

Camp v. Sturdevant, I6 Neb. 693 (1884).
'3 B. & S. 34 (Eng., 1862).
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It was held that B could not maintain an action against -C for the
amount of the cheque, because C was a bona fide holder for value.'
While the common law was not entirely clear upon this subject,
the Bills of Exchange Act and Negotiable Instruments Law are most
obscure, with the result that there is far more disagreement among
the authorities than there formerly was. The first intimation that the
common law had been changed by the Act was a dictum in Lewis v.
Clay,5 in which the Lord Chief Justice said that section 20 of the
Act,6 because of the use of the word "negotiated" in it, limited the
meaning of "holder in due course" to a person to whom the instrument had been indorsed by a holder.- Soon after came the case of
Herdman v. Wheeler,' deciding squarely, in accordance with that
dictum, that "negotiated" in section 20 could mean only a transfer
from one holder to another; and that therefore a payee could hot be
a holder in due course. The court took the view that under section
29 of the Act " a payee might be a holder in due course; but that

this section was definitely limited by section

20.

In the United States,

the influence of this decision brought about a similar holdirig in Iowa,
in Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk; 0 and other jurisdictions have since
adopted the same interpretation of section 14 of the Negotiable Instrumnents Law (which is modeled closely after section 20 of the
Bills of Exchange Act)." t But the great preponderance of authority
in this country is to the effect that the common law has not been
changed in this regard by the Negotiable Instruments Law.1 2 And
'Supr-, note 3, p. 39. "When the defendant received the cheque, and when
he cashed it, he was a holder for value, and had clearly a right to the cheque
and the cash. He took the cheque, as the jury found, without notice, and he
took it for a good consideration . . ." The court goes on to say that, therefore, the plaintiff was properly non-suited.
'67 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 224, 227 (Eng., 1897).
I Cf. the N. 1. L. § 14.
'Without explanation of his reasoning, he simply referred to the B. E. A.
§§ 20, 21, 29, 30, 38, 83, 84, 88 and 89 (cf. N. I. L. §§ i4; 16; 52, 55, 58; 24,
59; 57, 51; 184, 5; 60) as restricting the definition of "negotiation' so as to
give it the meaning of a "transfer from one holder to another."
[i9o2] x K. B. 361. See i5 H av. L REv. 579 (I9Oa).
'Cf. the N. L L. § 52.
'6135 Iowa 350, 112 N. W. 8o7 (I9o7).
' Devoy & Kuhn Coal Co. v. Huttig, 174 Iowa 357, 156 N. W. 413 (1916);
Southern Nat. L. Corp. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 8o, i98 S. W. 543 (1917);
Long v. Shafer, 185 Mo. App. 641, 171 S. W. 6go (9x4); Bank of Gresham
v. Walch, 76 Ore. 272, 147 Pac. 534 (1915). And see cases in BRANNAN, Tut
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW, 50 (3d ed., i920).

"Er parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356, 67 So. 839 (94); Ryle v.
Farmers & Merchants Bank, 33 Ga. App. 459, 127 S. E. 233 (94);
Drum
Const. Co. v. Forbes, 305 Ill. 303, 137 N. E. 225 (1922); Liberty Trust CO. v.
Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, io5 N. E. 6o5 (914); Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Co,
171 App. Div. 776, 157 N. Y. Supp. 959 (1916); Potts v. First State Bank,
51 Okla. 162, 151 Pac. 859 (x95); Johnston v. Knipe, 26o Pa. 504, io5 AtL
705 (i918). And see cases collected in BRANNAN, supra, note ii, pp. 5z et seq.,
161 et seq.; 36 HARV. L. REv. 751 (1923).
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in Canada and New Zealand the same conclusion has been reached."
That the English courts soon became dissatisfied with the view
which they had taken is evident in the cases that have been decided
since Herdinan v. I hceler. The case of Lloyds Bank V. Cook 14
differed hardly at all from that case, but a decision was given for the
defendant payee, on the ground of estoppel in pais. The court, not
wishing to overrule its former judgment, and being no more anxious
through the application of its own rule to arrive at a conclusion
plainly erroneous on the facts of the case, dodged the dilemma altogether. But Fletcher Moulton, L. J., added a well considered dictum
in which he renounced the doctrine of Herdinan v. Iheeler. His
reasoning was as follows: section 2 of the Act " defines a holder
as being "a payee or indorsee . . . ;" according to section 30: 2,1o
"Every holder is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course"
unless fraud or some like circumstance is alleged, which circumstance, however, only shifts the burden of proof; section 29: 1,17
does not exclude payees from the class of holders in due course unless "negotiated" means "indorsed ;" but this it clearly does not, by
definition in section 31: I,'1 in which it is stated that "an -instrument
is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in
such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof."
All this, however, was only a dictum, and the older construction of
the Act remained unchanged. Two subsequent decisions, Smith v.
Prosser,9 and Glenie v. Bruce Smith,2 0 though they are not squarely
in point, mark the same desire of the court to free itself of its original
interpretation.
The recent case of Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd.,21 is in
line with these decisions. There, A fraudulently induced B to give
him a cheque for £5ooo payable to C. On the face of the cheque
was written "not negotiable." A then delivered the cheque to C, who
was ignorant of the fraud, for value, on his own account. The
cheque was duly honored. Later B discovered the fraud, and sued
C to recover the amount of the cheque as money had and received
to the use of the plaintiff. The court held that B could not recover,
basing its judgment chiefly on the quasi-contractual rights of the
parties.
Had the court been willing to decide the case fundamentally,
"See

BRANN AN, supra, note 11, p. 52.

i K. B. 794.
"Cf. the N. L L. § i91.
Cf. the N. L L. § 59.
"Cf. the N. L L. § 52.
Cf. the N. L L. § 3o.
" [1907 2 K. B. 735"[1i98l i K. B. 263.
2'[i9o7]

1

[1925]

2

K.

B. 61.
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according to the rule concerning payees as holders in due course, its
decision would have been the reverse of what it actually was; for the
English rule, as has been shown,, does not protect the payee. But
the court made no reference whatever to the rule or to any of the
cases that established it or came under it, though these cases were
cited and largely relied upon by the counsel. Pollock, M. R., found
that C was a holder for value under section 27: 2 of the Bills of
Exchange Act." - This, of course, does not answer the real question
one way or the other. But he also made the following statement: 23
"It seems to me... that the case of Watson v. Russell and the observations contained in it, and in the case of Symonds v. Atkinson 24
apply, and that these are illustrations which justify one in holding
that the plaintiff cannot establish as against the defendants, in cases
like the present, that money which has found its way into defendants'
pockets was ever had and received by them to the plaintiff's use."
(It will be remembered that Watson v. Russell was an early English
case which held, in effect, that a" payee could be a holder in due
course.) This was the decision of the Master of the Rolls upon the
first count of the complaint-that of money had and received. Sargant, L. J. said:"

"In my judgment . . . the case comes exactly

within the principle of Watson v. Russell." He based his judgment
in favor of the defendant chiefly upon this ground. Lord Scrutton,
the other Lord Justice who sat upon the case, did not rely upon
Watson v. Russell in his opinion, but based a dictum upon it. He
said he did not propose to decide what would have been the result,
had C in this case sued B upon the cheque. He added: 2" "It must
not, however, be taken from that that I think that such an action
as that would have failed. I think that the passage which has been
read from the case of Watson v. Russell shows that it probably would
have succeeded." He says further that "as between drawer and
payee, the marking of the cheque 'not negotiable' does not affect a
right of action on the cheque at all." This, it is submitted, follows
logically from either interpretation of the Bills of Exchange Act.
Thus the English court appears not only to avoid making any
further precedents that would bind it to its former construction of
the Act, but to take a step, or, at least, to lean perceptibly, toward
the rule of the original common law and of the law merchant,
that a payee may, at times, be as fully protected as the holder in due
course under the Act.
Cf. the N. I. L. § 26.

Supra, note 21, p. 628.
i H. & N. 146 (Eng., 1856).
Supra, note 21, p. 644.
"Supra, note 21, p. 641.

NOTES

Upon careful reading of the Negotiable Instruments Law (which
does not differ from the Bills of Exchange Act in the parts applicable
to this discussion), the following sections stand out as controlling
the payee's rights: section 52 defines a holder in due course as "a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
• - 3. That he took it in good faith and for value. 4. That at the
time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the
instrument or defect in the title of the person -negotiating it." The
definition of the word "holder" used at the beginning of this quotation is given in section 191 as a "payee or indorsee of a bill or note.
t It follows that a holder in due course (under section 52)
may be a "payee who took the instrument .... (subsection 3) in good
faith and for value." It then must be determined whether subsection
4 has the effect of qualifying what has gone before. Section 30 provides that "an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from
one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee
the holder thereof." So far, the definition of "negotiated" may well
include the issue of the instrument from the maker to the payee; and
the first part of section 52 (as quoted above) does not seem limited
by subsection 4. But section 3o goes on to say: "If payable to
bearer it (the instrument) is negotiated by delivery; if payable to
order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed
by delivery." Undoubtedly this last part of the section does restrict
the meaning of "negotiated," if it was meant to include all the ways
in which an instrument might be negotiated. But it was held in
Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton2 ' that such was not the intention of the
makers of the law; that the last part of section 30 was drawn to
describe merely some of the methods of negotiation. In all probability, this is the correct interpretation. It is the preferable one, for
it agrees with the common law and with the universal custom of
merchants. 8 In any case, it would seem that the common law should
still apply, in view of section 196, which provides that the rules of
the law merchant shall govern wherever the statute has made no provision ;29 and in view of the usual rule of statutory construction, that
where the new law is uncertain or conflicting the common law shall
prevail.
O. LW.
*

'Supro, note 12. See also Ex Parte Goldberg & Lewis, ibid.
"See BRANNAN, supra, note 11, p. 54. See also Heening, The Uniform
Negotiable Instrument Law, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 471, 478 et seq. (1911).
"B. E. A., § 97; 2 is still more applicable. It provides that "The rules of
common law, including the law merchant, save so far as they are inconsistent
with the express provisions of this act shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques!'
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GIFT TAx-The Federal Revenue Act
of 1924' imposed a graduated tax on the transfer by gift of any
property wherever situated, whether made directly or indirectly. The
the tax was appended to the inheritance tax and one of its purposes
was to prevent the evasion of that tax by means of gifts not made
in contemplation of death. The inheritance tax itself covered gifts
made within two years of death by creating a presumption that they
were made in contemplation thereof.
The constitutionality of the tax has been attacked on the ground
that it violates Sections 2 and 9 of Article I of the United States2
Constitution, which declare that direct taxes must be apportioned.
Judges in the Federal District Courts have recently reached opposite
conclusions as to whether the tax is direct," and hence void, because
not apportioned. In McNeir v. Anderson the tax was held unconstitutional by Judge Augustus Hand; while in Blodgctt v. Holden 4
its constitutionality, was sustained by Judge Raymond. Before examining the soundness of these decisions, it is worth while to consider the historical and economic background of the subject and the
state of the law before the cases just mentioned were decided.
The provision that direct taxes must be apportioned was adopted
as part of the compromise by which slaves were to be counted as
three-fifths of a person in the census taken to determine the number
of Congressmen each state should send to the House of Representatives. It was adopted to allay the fears of the South that capitation
and land taxes would be levied, which would fall most heavily on
the planter because of his ownership of large estates and slaves. Just
what a direct tax was supposed to be is stated nowhere in the records
of the Federal Convention nor in the pages of the Federalist. The
first authoritative discussion was in Hylton 'b. United States' where
direct taxes were -suggested to be confined to capitation and land
taxes. And this theory was regarded as satisfactory for a hundred
years. Then in 1895 it was held in Pollock v. FarmersLoan & Trust
Co.6 that an income tax, when derived from real or personal property,
was a direct tax, and must be apportioned.
As subsequently explained in Knowlton v. Moore,7 the Pollock

'Revenue Act 1924, Part 2, Title 3, Sec. 319, 43 Stat. 313, U. S. Comp. Stat.
(Supp. 1925) § 63364/52 Article I., Sec. 2, Clause 3: "Representative and direct taxes shall
be ap-

portioned among the several states which may be included in this union, according to their respective numbers."
Article I., Sec. 9, Clause 4: "No capitation, or other direct tax shall be
laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed
to be taken"
SD. C., S. D., N. Y., decided Feb. i5, x926. Not yet reported.
D. C., W. D., Mich., decided Feb. i7, 1926. Not yet reported.
3 Dall. 171 (U. S., 1796).

158 U. S. 6oz (1895).
'178 U. S. 41 (1goo).
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case decided that a tax levied on a person solely because of
his general ownership of property is a direct tax. And this definition
still
stands.
As noted above, the Pollock case held that an income tax was
a direct tax hecause to tax what gives value to property is to
tax the
property itself. Following this line of reasoning, it has been
tended that since what gives value to property are the various conincidents of ownership, such as the right to give, to use, to
a tax
on any of these incidents is a direct tax. In connection sell,
this
argument it is well to remember two things. In the first with
place the
Pollock case was a five to four decision and was made possible
only
because one judge changed his mind after the reargument; it
a storm of protest at the time; and in so far as it rendered aroused
a tax on
income void, it was rendered ineffective by the Sixteenth Amendment.
In the second place, in the thirty-one years since the decision
handed down, there has been only one decision of the Supreme -was
Court
holding a tax unconstitutional because direct and unapportioned.1
And in that case the tax was on the ownership itself of- property
and not on any of the incidents thereof. In fact, it might be contended
that an income tax can be differentiated from a tax on any
incident of property such as the right to sell, because it falls other
pendent of any act of the owner and is on the one incident indewhich
gives the property the major part of its value. In view of the
hundred and thirty years' history of the interpretation of the
meaning
of a direct tax, it seems most unlikely the. the Supreme Court
will
see fit to extend the doctrine of the Pollocte case if it can be avoided.
It is only fair to note, however, before leaving the historical
aspect of the question, that in the whole history of American
and
English taxation there is no record of a gift tax before the
Act of
1924. Many of the taxes which have been held
indirect by
preme Court were placed in that category largely on the Suhistorical
grounds.9
It is submitted, however, that while the subject is one in which
historical classification is given much weight, the mere novelty
tax is not sufficient to render it unconstitutional, particularly of the
of the history of the interpretation of a direct~tax mentioned in view
above.
From the economic point of view the objection to that which
all
parties admit to be a direct tax is that it is in the nature
of a capital
*Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. x89 (5921) : held a tax on stock
dividends
to be a direct tax.
'See Holmes, J., in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
349
(x92o), where, in discussing the argument that the Federal Inheritance
Tax was
direct he said: "But that matter is disposed of-not by an attempt
to make some
scientific distinction, which would be at least difficult,
on an interpretation
of language by its traditional use--on the practical andbuthistorical
ground that
this kind of tax has always been regarded as the antithesis of a
direct tax; 'has
ever been treated as a duty or excise because of the particular
gives use to its levy.' 178 U. S. 81, 83. Upon this point a pageoccasion which
of history is
worth a volume of logic."
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levy. There can be little quarrel by economists with a tax on gifts.
The basis is the same as that on which the inheritance tax rests and
it is submitted that economically that basis is a sound one. A capital levy on the other hand might well have serious economic results.
Any tax levied on capital tends to consume the resources from which
the income on which the nation lives arises, and hence to bring
about national bankruptcy through killing the goose that lays the
golden egg. A tax on current acquisitions might continue indefinitely,
whereas a capital levy if pushed to the extreme would leave nothing
to tax the following year. While the courts might feel that such a
serious change in taxing policy was incompatible with the Constitution, it is submitted that they will be extremely chary of limiting
the very broad, and on the whole wisely used, taxing powers of
Congress on a technicality unsupported by any sound economic
theory.
Turning then to the cases which interpret the test laid down
above: a tax on property solely because of its general ownership is
a direct tax. Since the test was laid down, the only tax held to fall
within its terms was the tax on stock dividends.1" There is an intimation in another case to the effect that a general sales tax would
be a direct tax because on an incident of property."' And in a case
arising under a State Constitution a tax on removing whiskey from a
bonded warehouse was held a property tax, because to tax the right
to remove was to tax that which gave value to the property and hence
to tax the property itself.' 2 This latter case, however, did not even
refer to the Pollock case, and did not state that the tax was on property because of its ownership. It should also be noted that the right
to give, although undoubtedly desirable, is of little economic value and
consequently adds little if anything to the intrinsic worth of the property.
On the other hand there are innumerable cases holding taxes
to be indirect. The first case in the books touching this problem was
one in which a tax on carriages was sustained as indirect.13 It has
been held that a tax on tobacco was not direct because it is not on
property as such, but has reference to the origin and intended use of
the article taxed.14 Similarly the corporation tax was held an excise
tax and hence indirect, because it was on the privilege of doihg business in a corporate capacity and not on property because of its ownership. "
0 Eisner v. Macomber, supra, note 8.
Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 5o9 (1898).
Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288 (igi).
U Hylton v. U. S., supra, Note 5. It is interesting to note that Madison
thought the tax direct (letter to Jefferson, May 1x, 1794) and that Hamilton.
who argued the case for the government, disagreed with him.
'Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 6o8 (1902).
"Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 22o U. S. i07 (191 ).
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A slightly different test was suggested where a
stamp tax on
nemorandums of sale of stock was held indirect because
a tax on a
;)articular business transaction, which was contingent on
the
happening of the sale, and hence (lid not impose an absolute
and unavoidable
demand ol the owners of the certificate."
If
element of absolute and unavoidable demand is necessary to a this
direct tax, surely the
gift tax does not fall within the definition, for the
owner is certainly
not bound to give his property away, and, by failing
to do so, he can
avoid the imposition of a tax on his property.
In considering this
case it is important to distinguish the shiftability
as a test of directness was expressly repudiatedof the tax-which
Moorc 17 -from the absolute and unavoidable demandin Knowlton v.
of the Thomas
case. Whether the burden of the tax when collected
owner of the property, or can be shifted by him onto falls on the
someone else,
is an entirely different question from whether the
tax
is going to
fall on anyone at all. For instance, a tax on land
can
be
shifted by
the landlord through the medium of increased rents
the tenant; but, despite its shiftability, the tax is an collected from
avoidable demand, because as long as the landlord absolute and unthe property, regardless of whether he uses it or not,remains owner of
tax. Consequently it falls within the test of a directhe must pay the
tax laid down
above.
One other case is worthy of mention. In Billings
v. United
Slates Is a tax on the use of foreign built yachts
was
sustained
as
indirect on the ground that the tax was on the objective
of the yacht as distinguished from the subjective passive active use
right to use,
which was an incident of ownership. Hence it was
was not on property at all, and consequently was held that the tax
reasoning be sound it would seem to apply with indirect. If this
equal force to the
gift tax, which is imposed on the active transfer of
which point all the incidents of ownership in the the property, at
donor have been
divested, rather than on the passive right to use, which
is an incident
of ownership.
There is another theory on which the
can be justified. In
Knowlton v. Moore the inheritance tax wastaxupheld
as being a tax
on the transfer of property. It was said that no one
has
the natural
right to acquire property by will or descent;
the state gives this
privilege and therefore can tax its exercise. that
Those who
gift tax to be direct differentiate it from the inheritance believe-the
ground that whereas the right to acquire a decedent's tax on the
property is
given-by the state by statute, the right to give is independent
of state
authority and a natural right. However in Keeney
v.
New
York i9
the Supreme Court sustained the validity of a state
statute imposing
"Thomas v. U. S., 192 U. S. 363 (19o4).
a See note 7, supra.
u232 U. S. 261 (1914).
1"222

U. S. 525 (1gri).
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a tax on transfers of property by deed intended to take effect at
death. In doing so the court stated that the right to transfer property by such a deed was as much dependent on the law as that of
acquiring property by inheritance. If this be true, it would seem
that the right to transfer property, independent of the contemplati6n of death, is also dependent upon the law for its validity. From
this it would follow that the gift tax and the inheritance tax were
in reality sisters under the skin. And there would seem to be much
strength in the argument, for, although the legal formalities in the
case of inheritance are greater, yet transfers all depend upon the law
for their validity in the last analysis.
Summarizing then the results of this analysis of the problem, we
reach the following result. The argument for holding the tax di20
rect, hence unconstitutional, are twofold:
I. The classification of taxes is a matter largely historical. In
the whole field of English and American taxation there is no previous record of the imposition of a gift tax. Since all indirect taxes
have some historical analogy to fall back on, the gift tax must be
a direct tax.
2. The test laid down by Pollock v. Farmers Loan.& Trust Co.
and the cases explaining it is: "A tax on property solely because of
its general ownership is a direct tax." To tax that which gives property value is to tax the property itself. That which gives value to
property are the ordinary incidents of ownership.. The right to give
is one of these incidents. This tax is in reality on the right to give
and hence is a direct tax.
In McNcir v. Anderson these arguments are clearly and forcefully outlined by Judge Hand.
The reasons for holding the tax indirect and hence constitutional may be summarized as follows:
Admitting the test of the Pollock case, i. c., a direct tax is one
levied on property solely because of its general ownership, the gift
tax is not direct for:
i. Historically there are no cases which hold a tax direct because imposed on one of the incidents of ownership, except that part
of the Pollock case which was rendered ineffective by the Sixteenth
Amendment. By reason of the circumstances surrounding that decision it should not be extended.
2. Even if a tax on an incident of property is a property tax,
this tax is not on such an incident, but on the transfer of the ownership. This actual transfer is independent from that subjective
incident of ownership, the right to give, the tax being on the act of
transfer and not on the proprietary right to give.
"The constitutionality of the tax is also attacked on the ground that it
contains retroactive provisions which render it void. This question is outside
the scope of this note.

NOTES
3. Even if .the tax is on property, it is not imposed solely because of general ownership, for active steps by the owner are necessary before the tax will be imposed. There is, in other words, no
absolute and unavoidable demand, which is the explanation given
in the Thomas case of the word "solely" in the definition above.
4. The inheritance tax has been upheld as a tax on the transfer of property. It has been intimated that a tax on gifts causa
mortris will be valid for similar reasons. There is no valid distinction
between gifts causa mortis and gifts not made in contemplation of
death, hence a tax on the latter form of gift is as valid as on the
former.
Judge Raymond in Blodgett V. Holdcn stresses the first two of
these arguments only. It would seem, however, that all four are
worthy of weight. The cases will undoubtedly reach the Supreme
Court in course of time and while it would be rash to hazard a guess.
as to the conclusion that tribunal will reach, it is submitted that the
arguments in favor of the constitutionality of the measure seem the
more persuasive.
Jos. S. C., Jr.
THE DUTY OWED BY AN ELEVATOR OWNER TO PASSENGERS-

To be carried vertically from one floor of a building to another by
an elevator is an experience common to most people, and perhaps
to everyone who lives in a city. With the development of the "skyscraper" type of building, elevators have become even more indispensable in our every-day life than automobiles. Modern science has
made great strides in perfecting them mechanically, and in this manner safeguarding the lives of persons carried upon them. Nevertheless, safety devices have not yet been developed to the point where
accidents are impossible. Passengers can still be, and are, injured
through defects in the machinery, or improper operation of the car.
The recent case of McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co.' arose from
an unusual and somewhat peculiar accident. The plaintiff's husband,
with a helper, was engaged in moving a safe from one floor of the
defendant's building to another. A freight elevator in the building,
operated by one of the defendant's servants, was, used for this purpose, and the safe was placed upon it. Upon reaching the lower
floor, the plaintiff's husband stepped off the elevator into a corridor
four or five feet in width, and guided the safe as his helper pushed
it. While the rear wheels were still on the car, the elevator suddenly
moved upward, 2 tilting the heavy safe forward so that it crushed
'285 Pa. 489, 132 AtI. 575 (1926).
'The reason for this movement did not appear. The statement of claim
made a general charge of negligence in "allowing the elevator to move upward."
At the trial there was some evidence that the operator was standing with his
hand on the starting rope a moment or so before the accident occurred. This
was denied by the operator himself on the witness stand. In any event, the
court followed the rule stated in Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127, 57 At. 356 (1904),
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the plaintiff's husband against the wall of the corridor. In a suit
by the widow to recover damages for the death of her husband,
there was a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the court held that
the relation of carrier and passenger existed between the deceased
and the defendant at the time of the accident,3 and that the case
was governed by the rules applicable to those who own 4 and operate
passenger elevators. 5 This raises the question of what acts or omissions on the part of the owner will render him liable for the injury
of a person on his elevator.
It is well established that the owner of an elevator is not an
insurer of the safety of the persons whom he carries,6 and that he
will not be held liable for any injury which the exercise of due care
could not have prevented. Consequently, the first problem presented
is the determination of what is due care in the circumstances:
In the leading case of Treadwcll v. Whittier,T it was held that

the defendants, who operated an elevator in their store, were carriers
of passengers, and were bound to exercise the highest degree of care
in the construction, maintenance, and operation of their elevator. The
court said that there was no real distinction between the carriage of
passengers vertically and horizontally, and that the defendants were
subject to the same responsibilities as to care and diligence as Were

carriers of passengers by stage-coach or railroad.

In the course of

to the effect that the happening of the accident in such circumstances raised a
prina facie presumption of negligence. This rule is applied generally, even in
those jurisdictions which profess to require a lower standard of care than the
Pennsylvania court. exacts. Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. F 925
(19oi) ; Edwards v. Mfgrs. Bldg. Co., 27 R. I. 248, 61 AtI. 646 (i9o5).
See
also 9 R. C. L. 1259; io C. J. io39. The presumption does not arise, however,
where specific acts of negligence are alleged. Orcutt v. Century Bldg., 201
Mo. 424, 99 S. W. io62 (I9o6). Nor where the person injured is an employee
of the defendant. Specs v. Boggs, I98 Pa. 112, 47 At]. 875 (igoi).
'The relation was not terminated merely because the deceased was not inside the car. It exists -while a person is entering or leaving. Fox v. Phila.,
supra, note 2. In the words of Mr. Justice Kephart, in McKnight v. S. S.
Kresge Co., supra, note z, where one has alighted from an elevator, but is engaged in direct connection with the car, he has not lost his identity as a passenger.
' The duty is personal, and cannot be delegated. Tippecanoe L &-T. Co. v.
Jester, 18o Ind. 357, ioi N. F_. 915 (913) ; Sciolora v. Asch, i98 N. Y. 77,
91 N. E. 263 (igio); Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N. Y. 357, 13o N. E.
577 (1921); Connolly v. Des Moines Investment Co., x3o Iowa 653, io5 N. W.
400

(19o6).

'Where the owner of a freight elevator permits a passenger to ride on it
he is held to the same degree of care as to its operation as if it were a passenger
elevator. Springer v. Ford, 189 Il1. 43o, 59 N. E. 953 (1go). See also Orcutt
v. Century Bldg.,

201

Mo. 424, 438, 99 S. W.

1o62,

io64 (i9O6),

where the

court drew an analogy between this situation and. the case of a stockman accompanying his stock who rides in the caboose of a freight train.
'Treadwell v. Whittier, 8o Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889) ; Springer v. Ford,
spro, note 5; Tippecanoe L. & T. Co. v. jester, supra, note 4; Orcutt v. Century Bldg., supra, note 2; McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co., supra, note i.
'Supra, note 6.

NOTES

the opinion it is said that the utmost care must be used by persons
engaging in employments where "human beings submit their bodies
to their control, by which their lives or limbs are put at hazard, or
where such employment is attended with danger to life or limb."
The court evidently regarded this as the basis of the duty imposed
upon railroads, and pointed out that the dangers are greater in the case
of elevators. When an accident does occur, the injury is almost
always serious, and frequently fatal. If, then, any distinction is to
be made between the duties imposed on railroads and elevator owners, a higher degree of care should be required of the latter.
Under the principle just stated, an elevator owner must use
all reasonable efforts to furnish good machinery, built with good
materials, and of a kind found safest for the purpose. He must
exercise the same degree of care to maintain his elevator in a safe
8
condition.

In the Treadwcll case, it was held that the trial judge

committed no error when he instructed the jury that the defendants
were liable for any defect in the machinery discoverable on a reasonable and careful examination according to the best known tests
reasonably practicable. It follows that the utmost care must be employed in the operation of the elevator.
Some courts," in adopting the standard of care described by the
California court in the Treadwvell case,"0 have held that one who
maintains and operates a passenger elevator is a common carrier."1
This would seem to be clearly wrong, inasmuch as there is no obligation to serve all members of the public. 12 It is to be doubted whether
any court would take this extreme position where the question is
squarely presented in another way. 3 On the contrary, such a holding
seems to be more of a means to an end. That is to say, it is invoked
8

Supra, note 6.
Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollit, 172 Ill. 222, 5o N. E. 178 (1898) ; Springer
v. Ford. supra, note 5; Tippecanoe L. & T. Co. v. Jester, supra, note 4; Kentucky Hotel Co. v. Camp, 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. IV., 1oo (1895) ; Orcutt v. Century
Bldg., supra, note 2; Murphy's Hotel v. Cuddy's Adm'r, 124 Va. 207, 97 S. E.
794 (1919).
'8 Supra, note 6.

'Where the person injured is a tenant of the building,
the servant of a
tenant, some of these courts have found that the owner oforthe
elevator is a
carrier for hire, the "hire"

being included in the rent. Springer v. Ford, supra,
note 5. In Kelly v. Lewis Investment Co., 66 Ore. 1, 133 Pac. 826 (1913)
was held that an elevator owner was not a common carrier, but was a carrierit.
for hire.
' Seaver v. Bradley, 179 fass. 329, 6o N. E. 795 (spox),
Holmes,
C. J., said that the defendant could have shut the door of the where
in the
plaintiff's face, and could have arbitrarily refused to carry him elevator
without incurring any liability.
' In Seaver v. Bradley, sitpra, note 12, it was held that a statute defining
the duties of "common carriers" did not refer to persons operating elevators.
In Robb v. Merchants' Casualty Co., 29 Man. L. M. 13, 44 Dominion L. R. x85
(Can., 1918), it was held that an elevator was not a "public conveyance" within
the terms of an accident insurance policy.
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to fix the standard of care. From this point of view it is unnecessary, since the same result has been reached in other jurisdictions in
another way. These courts have said, in describing the standard
which they have adopted, that the owner of an elevator is in the
position of a common carrier, or that his liability is like that of a
common carrier." While it may be said that the difference is one
of expression only, it is submitted that these cases are more accurate.
Mr. Justice Kephart adopted this view in the McKnight case.,,
The courts of other jurisdictions have flatly rejected both of
the views stated above, and have insisted that the duty imposed upon
an elevator owner be described as one of ordinary care only. The
leading case in support of this view is Griffcn v. Manice16 Judge
Cullen, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, said that it was
probably true that no distinction could be drawn between vertical
and horizontal transportation, or between the duties imposed, if the
relationship between the parties and the character of the carrier were
the same. He found, however, that the defendant was not a common
carrier, and that the right of any person to be carried on his elevator
was based upon an implied invitation to all those having business
on the premises. The duty imposed upon an owner or occupant
of real estate in such a situation is to see that the premises are in
a reasonably safe condition. An exception would have to be made
to this general rule if one who owns an elevator is to be held to a
higher standard.
It is interesting to note that many courts have applied the rules
of property law in order to determine the rights of persons injured
while riding in automobiles.17 In the case of Munson v. Rupker,"
the court clearly pointed out the differences and difficulties involved.
A person going upon a tract of land takes it as he finds it, with
the knowledge that the owner cannot and will not start it in motion
and hurl it through space in a manner which may mean death to
him. One who puts a force in motion must control it with skill and
care in proportion to the danger created, whether the law of property
requires him to do so or not. This reasoning applies equally, and
perhaps more forcefully, to the case of an elevator, where the pas1 Mitchell v. Marker, 62 Fed. I39 (C. C. A., i894); Sweden v. Atkinson
Imp. Co., 93 Ark. 397, 125 S. W. 439 (1gio); Champagne v. Hamburger &
Sons, Inc., 169 Cal. 683, 147 Pac. 954 (1915) (following Treadwell v. Whittier,
supra, note 6) ; Cubbage v. Estate of Conrad Youngman, 155 Iowa 39, 134 N.
W. 1074 (1912) ; Ross v. Sisters of Charity, 14ILa. 6oi, 75 So. 425 (1917) ;
Belvidere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514. 64 At. 44 (i9o6); Goodsell v.
Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 42 N. W. 873 (1889); Quimby v. Bee Bldg Co., 87 Neb.
193, 127 N. A,\.
118 (19io); Fox v. Phila., supra, note 2; Riland v. Hirshler,
7 Pa. Super. 384 (1898); So. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Lawson, 97 Tenn. 367, 37

S. W. 86 (1896) ; Edwards v. Burke, 36 Wash. 107, 78 Pac. 6io (i9o4).
' Supra, note i.

' Supra, note 2.

" See 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. 86 (i925).

is148 N. E. 169 (Ind. 1925).

NOTES

senger is absolutely powerless to help himself. It shows that the
rule of property law, relied upon by the New York court, has no
proper application to the carriage of passengers in an elevator.
In the case of Edzeards v. Manufacturers' Building Co.,"9 the
Rhode Island court adopted the rule stated in Griffen v. Afanice,20
and criticized the reasoning of the Tread-a'el case.21 They pointed
out that the duty of highest care was imposed upon a common carrier not on account of the danger to passengers, but because of the
relation of the carrier to the public. While this may or may pot
be true, 22 it should have no effect in this situation, since, under the
better view above, the duty of an elevator owner is not based upon
the fact that he is a common carrier, but arises from the danger
of injury in the circumstances, and is merely described as similar
to the duty owed by a common carrier.2 3
Both the New York and the Rhode Island courts 24 stress the
argument that it would be unreasonable to require every person installing an elevator in his building, regardless of its size, to use the
most modern and improved type of elevator, the most successful
mechanical device, and the most skillful operators. It is pointed out
that there are elevators in small buildings and private homes as well
as in office buildings and hotels. Certainly, it would be a hardship
to require the owner of a small building to install -the same type
of elevator that is used in large office buildings. It would not seem
that the Tread-'ell case 21 would go to this extreme. The rule there
stated requires the exercise of the highest degree of care reasonably
practicable. 8
The difficulty with the rule of Griffen v. Manice 27 is that it
tends to establish a lower standard of care. Where one undertakes
to carry human beings vertically in a cage, where they submit themselves entirely to his control, and where the danger of injury is so
great unless proper precautions are taken, it would seem that ordinary
Supra, note 2.
, Supra, note 2.
' Supra, note 6.
"Cf. Seaver v. Bradley, supra,note 12; Belvidere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, supra,
note 14.
' See the text and cases cited, supra, note r4.
U

24The rule of these cases is followed in several other jurisdictions. McCracken v. Myers, 75 N. J. L. 935, 68 At]. 8o5 (I9o8) ; Burgess v. Stowe, 134
Mich. 304, 96 N. W. 29 (i903).

"Supra, note 6.
"Getty v. Hulton, izo Wash. 124, 188 Pac. io (1920).
Ferguson v.
Truax, 136 Wis. 637, xz8 N. W. 25, (i9o8) it was said that theIndefendant
was
bound to exercise the highest degree of care that men of reasonable vigilance
and foresight ordinarily exercise in the conduct of such business under similar

circumstances, and an instruction that the standard was such care as a very
prudent and skillful man would ordinarily use in the circumstances was held
to be erroneous.
"Supra, note 2.
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care in the circumstances must mean the utmost care reasonably practicable. This was recognized in an earlier New York case, 2 and the
facts of Griffen v. Man, ice . would not bring the case in conflict with
such a rule.30 Unfortunately, however, the language of the court does
definitely suggest a lower standard.
On the other hand, the rule of the Treadwell case 3! is not entirely satisfactory. The recognition of degrees of care, or of negligence, is always undesirable and misleading.32 For illustration, if
a jury be told that the standard of care is divided into the three
degrees of highest, ordinary, and slight care, and that in the case
before them, only slight care is required, there will be an inevitable
tendency on the part of the jury to think that the defendant was not
bound to take any precautions. A further, and better, illustration
may be found in the situation which we have been considering. If
the jury in such a case be told that the defendant was bound to exercise the highest degree of care, there will be a stronger and almost
irresistible tendency to hold him liable merely because the accident
occurred. The modern tendency is to avoid such difficulties by abolishing the division into degrees of care or of negligence even in the
case of recognized common carriers.3
, McGrell v. Buffalo Office Bldg. Co., 153 N. Y. 27!, 47 N. E. 3o5 (x897),
where the court said that the highest care might be required as to parts of the
machinery which might cause serious injury, and less care as to.other parts.
This is really the rule of reasonable care in the circumstances.
"Supra, note 2.
"The judgment in Griffen v. Manice, supra, note 2, was reversed solely on
the ground of the charge to the jury, without any consideration of the evidence,
and a new trial ordered. At the second trial it appeared that the elevator in
question had been made by a competent manufacturer, and had been inspected
a short time before the accident, which occurred when the car bumped at the
bottom of the shaft and in some way dislodged some of the counter weights.
A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside, and judgment entered for the defendant on the ground that the defendant could not possibly have foreseen that the
weights would be dislodged, and that he could not have prevented the accident
by the exercise of the utmost care. Griffen v. Manice, 36 N. Y. Misc. 364, 73
N. Y. S. 559 (igoi), aff'd 74 N. Y. App. Div. 371, 77 N. Y. S.626 (1902),
aff'd 174 N. Y. 505, 66 N. E. 1102 (1903). On this view of the facts, the case
is not inconsistent with the rule of Treadwell v. Whittier, supra, note 6.
" Supra, note 6.
' See the opinion of Page, J., in O'Brien v. N. Y. Rys., 185 N. Y. App. Div.
867, 874, 174 N. Y. S. 1x6, 121 (1919). See also 32 YALE L. J. 841. (1923);
31 YALE L. J. 555 (1922) ; ig CoL. L REv. 166 (1919). Of course, in some
jurisdictions the recognition of degrees of negligence and of care is definitely
settled. Mr. Justice Kephart, in McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co., supra, note r,
followed the established Pennsylvania law on this point. Fox v. Phila., supra,
note 2; Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, io7 AtL 383 (igig).
"Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655 (1919) ; Denny
v. Chic., etc., Ry., i5o Iowa 46o, 13o N. NV. 363 (191). In Young v.St. Louis
etc., Ry., 227 Mo. .307, 127 S. W. 19 (i9Io) the court said that degrees oi
negligence had been abolished, although degrees of care were still recognized.
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A few cases " have decided the question of the duty
of an
elevator owner to persons whom he carries under the
familiar and
simple rule of care commensurate with the danger, or,
as it is more
often expressed, reasonable care in the circumstances,
without referring either to degrees of care, or the duties of common
carriers,
or the duty of an owner of real estate to invitees. The
advantages
of this rule are apparent. Where, however, the choice
lies between
Griffen v. 21anice "* and Tread-well v. Vhittier," it is submitted
that
the stricter rule, adopted in McKnight v. S. S. Kresge Co.,37
is more
desirable, since it does not place too heavy a burden upon
the elevator
owner, and at the same time tends to give greater protection
to the
persons whom he carries.
L.B.C.
4

Jones v. Co-operative Ass'n, 109 Me. 448, 84 Atl. 985 (1912) ;
Lander v.
179 Pac. 21 (x918).
"Supra, note 2.
"Supra, note 6.
'Supra, note L

Hlornbeck, 74 Okla. 239,

